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I was asked to elaborate some thoughts on the topic of “The future of liberal democracies: 
The rise of populism”. The title of the topic suggests that populism is and will continue to be 
on rise. It also implies that the future of liberal democracy is intertwined with the populist 
phenomenon. Although I am uncertain about the growing prospects of populism, my 
prediction is that it will indeed stay with us for some more time, and I agree that it will impact 
liberal democracy, for better or worse. Therefore, I focus on the second implication of the 
topic title. I share those wide-spread concerns which consider populism a potential threat to 
liberal democracy and I will point to a specific consequence of populist politics which is the 
polarization of the polity and the erosion of democratic norms. However, I also argue that 
populism is more than simply a threat to liberal democracy: it is also a warning sign of some 
deep, structural problems of today’s socio-political systems and, as such, will presumably not 
go away until those problems, like growing inequalities in income and influence, persist. 
From this perspective the paradox of populism lies in that it is a reaction to the disintegration 
of the polity while it is also contributing to its further fragmentation, which, I believe, is one 
of the greatest challenges of today’s politics. 
 
Populism and liberal democracy 
Populism is a contested concept even within political science and has several, partly 
competing, partly overlapping, definitions, though it was already discussed in one of the 
classical works of modern political science. In the Political Man, Lipset (1960), inspired by 
examples of post-war Latin American politics, treated populism as an emerging extremist 
mass movement that relied on the lower classes. The original ‘populism as a movement’ 
perspective was later developed into three different approaches: first, populism as a political 
logic or political strategy ‘through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government 
power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly 
unorganized followers’ (Weyland, 2001:14). Second, populism as a political communication 
style or discourse (Laclau, 2005; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014) characterized by a Manichean 
logic (‘elite’ vs. ‘people’), adversarial narratives targeting the ‘enemies of the people’ as well 
as the depiction of crises that justify immediate political action. Third, maybe the most widely 
used approach conceptualizes populism as a thin-centred ideology without an elaborate 
ideological and programmatic core that expresses a heavily moralising Manichean worldview 
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and considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, arguing that politics should be an expression 
of the volonté générale of the people (Mudde, 2004).  
What is the relationship between populism and liberal democracy? 
Populism expresses the inherent tension between the democratic and non-democratic 
components of the modern political systems. Some argue that populism is an essentially 
democratic phenomenon, because it takes the common people as its political base and 
expresses a dissatisfaction with the ruling elites, institutions and politics, a dissatisfaction that 
may become a frustration or even resentment. Majoritarianism is a basic feature of democracy 
as well as populism (Pappas, 2014). In her seminal article Canovan (1999) argues that 
populism is a necessary ’redemptive’ face of democracy and the ’legitimacy of democracy as 
a pragmatic system (…) always leaves room for populism that accompanies democracy like a 
shadow’ (Canovan, 1999:16). 
However, today’s liberal democracy is much more than a majoritarian decision making 
mechanism: it is a complex institutional arrangement with check and balances, the division of 
powers, multiple veto players, constitutional safeguards as well as the protection of human 
rights and minority interests. It is generally argued that populism has an antagonistic 
relationship with the institutional and normative complexity of liberal democracy. First, 
populism is antithetical to pluralism: while the latter allows or even expects different interests 
and ideologies to be present in society and politics, the former posits a homogenous people 
(Mudde, 2004). Therefore, populist politics has a tendency to become exclusionary and 
intolerant, rejecting any compromise. Second, populist politics is generally based on the direct 
relationship of the leader and their followers as well as the direct translation of popular will 
into decisions. This is against the logic of liberal democracy with its complex institutional 
machinery (Bartha et al., 2020). Third, the protection of human rights and minority interests 
clashes with the idea of supreme popular sovereignty advanced by populism (Alston, 2017). 
Populism is a diverse and malleable phenomenon therefore it is difficult to make 
generalization about it. Some populist movements may strengthen democracy through filling 
a representation gap, as some Latin American examples illustrate the point, or promote more 
participative decision making models, as the Italian 5Stars movement does. Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) argue that populism might be exclusionary (building on a nativist, 
nationalist conceptualization of ‘the people’) or socially inclusionary and while European 
populism is predominantly exclusive, Latin American populism is chiefly inclusive. Both 
Canovan (1999) and Mudde and Rowira Kaltwasser (2013) assign some positive democratic 
effects to populism, chiefly in terms of filling the representation gap, reinvigorating popular 
rule and politically mobilizing people.  
Still, despite the great variety of populism we can safely posit that populism has a difficult 
relationship with liberal democracy, especially with its ‘liberal’ aspects: constitutionalism, 
rule of law, division of powers and protection of human rights. Both theoretical arguments 
and empirical studies demonstrate that populism is leaning towards illiberal politics (Huber 
and Schimpf, 2017; Pappas, 2014). That is, if populism will stay with us, let alone rise further, 
we have reasons to worry for the future of liberal democracy. 
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Populism may affect the liberal institutions mostly when in power; however, it can influence 
democratic norms as well as the practice of democracy even from the opposition. The next 
section points a particular feature of populist politics which has a definitely negative effect on 
democracy: increasing polarization. 
 
Polarization and the erosion of democratic norms 
Polarization refers to the division of the polity along ideological lines. It is not evident that 
this should pose any problems – after all, democracy is based on the competition of different 
ideologies, values and policy proposals.There are actually arguments in favor of at least some 
extent of political divergence. Politics, as Karl Schmitt convincingly put it, is about conflict. 
In fact, if the policy and ideological position of parties converge, elections have no real stakes 
and mobilizing potential. Conversely, polarization has a mobilizing effect on citizens 
(Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008) which is, ceteris paribus, good for democracy: without 
mobilization and participation democracy may hollow out and decisions will increasingly be 
taken by either non-elected institutions or political bodies with low legitimacy. The 2020 US 
presidential election offers an illustration to the mobilization potential of polarization: after 
four years of polarizing politics by Donald Trump the turnover at the elections was record 
high.  
However, even the pluralist democratic polity needs some ties that bind citizens together, the 
“sentiments of sociability” as Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it. They need to share a common 
identity, and feel to be part of the same community: identity is a strong predictor of 
cooperative behavior, and norm abidance (Tyler, 2011). People need to trust each other in 
order to be able to engage in collective action – self-interest is not a sufficient motivation 
(Ostrom, 1998). Citizens need to have some basic values in common and accept the “minimal 
consensus” on the principles of democracy (Downs, 1962). It is also needed that their political 
and policy preferences converge to some extent: otherwise “(…) half the electorate always 
feels that the other half is imposing policies upon it that are strongly repugnant for it. In this 
situation, if one party keeps get reelected, the disgruntled supporters of the other party will 
probably revolt (…)” (Downs, 1957: 143). 
Anthony Downs is maybe the first who warned about the dangers of extreme political 
polarization. Some level of polarization is bearable, or might even be beneficial to democracy 
– but we don’t have exact measures of the ‘healthy’ level of polarization, and today it appears 
that increasing and excessive polarization is more menacing than the lack of it in a number of 
countries, including the US as well as Eastern and Southern European countries (Patkós, 
2019; Somer et al., 2021). Somer et al. (2021) coined the term ‘pernicious polarization’ to 
describe the extreme division of the society into mutually distrustful ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’. 
They argue that there is a negative relationship between the level of polarization and the 
democracy ratings of countries. Patkós (2019) has a similar finding: political polarization 
erodes democratic quality, increases the risk of corruption, and diminishes the overall level of 
satisfaction with democracy as well as trust in political institutions. 
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What is the mechanism through which political polarization leads to negative democratic 
consequences? Körösényi (2013) argues that polarization undermines public accountability of 
politics, therefore good governance and democratic quality through the following effects: 
information selectivity (polarization fosters parallelism in the media system as well as media 
use – common understanding of what ‘is’ is vanishing); moral bias (common understanding 
of what ‘ought’ to be is undermined); patronage effect (frequent dismissals in the public 
administration erodes its attractiveness and ultimately its quality); delegitimizing politics 
(contributes to spreading political cynicism); poor policy-making (policy reforms are stopped 
if politics changes). 
Extreme polarization leads to a disintegration of the polity in which the members cease to 
share a common understanding of the political reality; cease to accept a minimal consensus on 
democratic norms; and cease to respect the other camp. Again, the four years of Donald 
Trump in office as well as the 2020 US presidential election and the bitter fight over the result 
offer a shocking illustration to these arguments. 
Polarization has several causes – and populist politics is among them (Pappas, 2014; Schulze 
et al., 2020). Although the populist discourse posits and constructs the concept of the 
homogenous people, they are contrasted to the enemies. The enemies are first and foremost 
elite groups, like old political elites (the ‘Washington swamp’), George Soros, the banks and 
financial institutions, or the European Union. But their supposed internal allies might also be 
easily targeted by populist politics, thus conducing to an effective division and polarization of 
the polity. Venezuela is a strong example where the populism of Chavez caused the extreme 
political division of the country, and led it to the verge of a civil war – and a total economic 
breakdown. 
Populism has a subversive nature. It has a penchant for questioning established institutions 
and norms, overstepping boundaries, and among them the limits of civility and political 
correctness. While this may seem liberating to some, it hurts those minorities (immigrants, 
LMBTQ people etc.) which are also often targeted by populist since they do not fit into the 
idealized and normalized concept of ‘the people’. 
Polarization, the erosion of democratic norms and the growing incivility of political camps 
towards each other is a deep wound on democracy. Populist politicians may lose their appeal, 
they may be defeated on elections – but polarization is hard to heal because it exploits deep 
psychological mechanisms and creates social identities that are difficult to change. For me 
this is one of the most alarming consequence of populism. 
 
On the Roots of Populism: Inequality 
However, while populism contributes to social and political polarization, it is also a product 
of social division. The roots of populism are manifold. Hawkins and Rowira Kaltwasser 
(2019) argue that populist attitudes are widely present in the society, but specific context and 
factors are needed to activate them. The latter refer to the ‘supply-side’ of populism in terms 
of politicians and political entrepreneurs who exploit the existing problems and frame them 
along the populist discourse. The former, according to Hawkins and Rowira Kaltwasser 
5 
 
(2019: 8), is usually an intentional failure of democratic representation, a “situation in which 
politicians’ act knowingly against one set of constituents in order to benefit others. The result 
is a feeling of indignation and resentment.” That is, in terms of social context the authors 
blame populism on the division of the polity by the ruling elites. 
However, division can happen not only along political, but socio-economic lines as well. 
There is overwhelming evidence on the role of socio-economic problems, like 
marginalization, joblessness and inequality in fuelling populist sentiments. Burgoon et al. 
(2018) argue that positional deprivation and inequality increases the support for radical right 
populist parties. In the DEMOS project2 we found that the lack of activation policies and the 
exclusion of a significant proportion of young people from the labour market clearly feeds 
populist attitudes. 
A dramatic illustration of this point is that during the 2016 US presidential election Donald 
Trump over performed the most in counties with poor health conditions, and the highest drug, 
alcohol and suicide mortality rates – strongly linked to economic distress.3 
The problem of growing inequalities in most of the countries is well known. Its causes are, 
again, complex, the explanations ranging from the capital accumulation mechanism of 
capitalism (Piketty, 2013), the increasing return of knowledge and education (Rodriguez-Pose 
and Tselios, 2009), the inherent logic of globalisation (Reich, 1991). Its dire consequences are 
also well documented. In their convincingly written study Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) show 
that income inequality is a factors behind a number of social ills, including substance abuse, 
health problems, shorter life expectancy, homicide rates, teenage birth rate, poor school 
performance. In their recent book, The Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism Case 
and Deaton (2020) argue that in the US life expectancy has fallen for three years in a row 
which is mainly due to the fast-increasing death rates of working-class Americans struck by 
economic hardship and joblessness. 
Compared to the US the European welfare-states provide more social protection to vulnerable 
groups, but the growth of inequality did not spare them either. These problems fuel populist 
sentiments and political entrepreneurs are ready to capitalize on them. An illustration is 
provided by the long struggle of the ‘gilets jaunes’, the French grassroot movement originally 
mobilized against the introduction of a new environmental fee by President Macron, turning 
into a general populist revolt. The ‘gilets jaunes’ expressed deep resentment about their socio-
economic problems and criticized the establishment with typical populist arguments. 
Unless mainstream politics is able to meaningfully address the problems of growing 
inequalities and social precarity populism will continue to have a solid basis to build on. This 
is, of course, not to say that inequality is the only factor that shapes populism or the single 
most important problem to deal with in this context. Other phenomena, like the role of social 









chambers’ that also contribute to political polarization, is also an extraordinary challenge to 
deal with. But I wanted to emphasize that if blame populism, and rightly so, for polarizing the 
polity we should keep in mind that our societies are already highly divided. This is a serious 
problem on its own right – and it contributes to strengthening populism as well. 
 
Conclusion 
Liberal democracy is more than a specific institutional arrangement of political rule and 
collective decision making. It comprises a set of norms, values and acceptable behaviours – a 
kind of political culture. Liberal democracy cannot properly function without some level of 
unity, integration and cooperation inside the polity. Populism undermines the unity of the 
polity through it highly polarizing logic and therefore it undermines democratic quality as 
well. However, our societies must face the challenge of already existing and deepening socio-
economic divisions which effectively fuel populist sentiments. In this perspective populism 
should be considered not only as a threat, but also as a warning sign. 
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